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1 Introduction
Varieties of the "new institutionalism" hold a promise of theoretical integration across
several sub-disciplines of the social sciences and a wide range of research fields, including
comparative politics, the study of European integration, comparative political economy,
comparative industrial relations, or comparative industrial governance (Hall & Taylor
1996; Jupille & Caporaso 1999; Thelen 1999). There are thus good reasons to explore the
usefulness of institutional explanations in comparative policy research as well. But in doing
so, we need to be aware of the special conditions that complicate their application in this
particular field. To begin with, it seems useful to specify the ways in which institutionalist
and policy perspectives may intersect.
The policy perspective focuses on two different questions which I described as being
"problem-oriented" and "interaction-oriented" (Scharpf 1997, 10-12). Under the first
perspective, policy research will analyze the nature and the causes of (societal) problems
that (public) policy is expected to resolve as well as the (empirical or potential)
effectiveness of policy responses to these problems. Quite obviously, much of the
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substantive knowledge required in problem-oriented policy analyses will not come from
political science but from other disciplines, such as macro-economics, labor-market
economics, public health, biology or climatology. Within the perspective of interaction-
oriented policy research, by contrast, political-science knowledge is likely to dominate
analyses of the interactions among policy makers, and of the conditions which favor or
impede their ability to adopt and implement those policy responses which problem-oriented
analyses have identified as being potentially effective. Similarly, the study of institutions
also includes two distinct perspectives, one focusing on the consequences that institutions
may have for actors and actions within their domains, the other one focusing on the
genesis of and transformation of institutional arrangements themselves. If we combine
these perspectives in a fourfold table, it is clear that interesting research questions may in
fact be located in all four cells.
In the first cell, one would locate "functionalist" attempts to explain the existence of
specific institutions by their ability to solve certain societal or economic problems - a
perspective which, for instance, informs the institutionalism of transaction-cost economics
(Williamson 1985). In the second cell, the perspective is reversed, asking how the
existence of given institutions contributes to the emergence or avoidance of certain societal
or economic problems - a perspective adopted by "structuralist" studies which, for
instance, are attributing differences in the rate of inflation to the existence or absence of
centralized wage-setting institutions (Calmfors & Driffil 1988) or of independent central
banks (Cukierman 1992). In the third cell, research could focus on how institutional
change may be explained as the outcome of strategic interactions among purposeful and
resourceful actors - a perspective which, for instance, has been highly productive in
explaining major institutional changes in the European Union as the outcome of strategic
interactions among national governments (Moravcsik 1998).
The fourth cell, finally, identifies the perspective on institutions that is characteristic of
interaction-oriented policy research. It treats institutions as one set of factors affecting the
interactions among policy actors, and hence the greater or lesser capacity of policy-making
systems to adopt and implement effective responses to policy problems. This is the
perspective adopted in the present article. It differs from the "structuralism" in cell 2 by its
actor-centered character. Actors and their interacting choices, rather than institutions, are
assumed to be the proximate causes of policy responses whereas institutional conditions, to
the extent that they are able to influence actor choices, are conceptualized as remote
causes (Scharpf 1997). But since actors differ in their orientations and capabilities, and
since we also need to take account of the problem perspective, the search for, or the use
of, institutional explanations faces characteristic difficulties in the context of in interaction-
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oriented policy research. These difficulties will be discussed in the following section before
I will then turn to the uses of institutional explanations in comparative policy studies.[1]
2 The Elusive Quest for Generality  
To a greater degree than is otherwise true in the social sciences, policy research aspires to
pragmatic usefulness in the sense that it should be able to provide information which (if
heeded by policy makers - which is another question altogether) could contribute to the
design of effective and feasible policy responses to given societal problems. At the
practical end of a continuum, this calls for in-depth analyses of specific policy problems
and interaction constellations that may best be done by consultants or by the in-house
staffs of ministerial departments and other policy-making organizations, rather than by
theory-oriented academic research. At the same time, however, such applied work would
greatly benefit from being able to draw on empirically validated theoretical propositions
specifying general causal mechanisms affecting the feasibility and effectiveness of policy
options
Given the multi-dimensionality and variety of real-world policy problems, however, any
general theoretical proposition can at best cover partial aspects that need to be integrated
with other partial theories in the development of effective policy designs - just as the
solution of any complex engineering problem will draw on a wide range of distinct natural-
science theories. But in policy research even the search for partial theories is affected by
the real complexity of its subject matter. While the natural sciences can often rely on
experimental designs in order to isolate the causal effect of a single factor, this is not
usually possible in the social sciences. Here the comparative empirical study of real-world
phenomena is generally our only way to discover causal relationships. But regardless of
whether comparison is inter-temporal, cross-sectional, or cross-national (which will be my
focus here): If institutional conditions are thought to matter, they are in themselves very
complex "factors" with a high degree of variability across time and space. Moreover, if the
dependent variable is to be policy responses, interaction-oriented policy research must also
consider at least two additional sets of factors that are likely to have causal influence - the
characteristics of the policy problems faced, and the characteristics of the policy actors
involved. These conditions constrain the design of theory oriented and empirical policy
research (Scharpf 1997, chapter 3).
The standard way of dealing with complex factor constellations in empirical research is
through multivariate statistical analyses that seek to identify the causal effect of specific
variables while trying to control for the influence of other factors. Since internationally
comparative policy studies are inevitably plagued with the "small-n problem" of too many
variables and too few cases, it has become common practice to multiply the number of
available observations by relying on cross-country pooled time-series data (Beck & Katz
1995). Their usefulness is limited, however, by the fact that some of the factors that
influence outcomes may be both country-specific and relatively stable over time, so that
the multiplication of observations does not increase the available information to nearly the
same degree. The same is true if exogenous shocks (like the oil-price crises of 1973-1975
and of 1979-81) affect all countries at the same time. If these "fixed effects" are then
accounted for by the introduction of country and year dummies in the regression equations,
what is left is statistical information about relationships among variables that are cleaned of
all influences that are specific for a given country or a given time period.
In the field of comparative political economy, there is a growing and methodologically
sophisticated literature relying on these remedies for the small-n-disease. They seem most
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useful for the identification of stable ceteris-paribus relationships of an essentially
"structural" character. Examples are studies of the relative influence of economic growth,
trade openness, capital mobility and other "economic" factors on the one hand, and of the
political and organizational strength of left-of-center political parties, of labor unions, or
corporatist institutional arrangements and other "institutional" factors on the other hand, on
levels of taxation and social spending (Rodrick 1997; Garrett 1998; Garrett & Mitchell
1999; Hicks 1999). Similar methods are used to assess the effects of wage dispersion on
private service employment (Iversen & Wren 1998), of central-bank independence on
inflation (Cukierman 1992 ), or of more or less centralized wage-setting institutions on
inflation and unemployment (Calmfors & Driffil 1988; Soskice & Iversen 1999; Iversen
1999). From the perspective of developing politico-economic theory, these are very useful
studies, even though their reach is constrained either by the availability of quantitative
time-series data that are cross-nationally standardized, and by the need to reduce complex
qualitative factors to quasi-quantitative indicators or to dummy variables.
From a policy perspective, however, the information that is screened out through the use of
country and year dummies in pooled cross-section time-series regressions may be more
important than the statistical regularities that are discovered. Exogenous challenges may
change radically over time, and even if all countries were confronted with the same
challenge at a given time (say, the dramatic rise of real interest rates in the international
capital markets of the early 1980s), countries with different economic and social
structures, and with different policy legacies may differ greatly in their vulnerability and
hence in problems that their policy systems must deal with. Moreover, even where these
"fixed effects" play no role, the information used in multivariate regressions is generally
too "thin", and the probabilistic effects identified are too uncertain to provide much
guidance for policy choices in specific historical constellations.
Turning instead to historical studies of single cases, which may do justice to the complexity
of interacting factors, cannot be the answer, since these will not allow lessons to be derived
for other cases, let alone cumulative theory development.[2] For some purposes, it may be
useful to combine deductive theoretical work and statistical analyses of some empirical
indicators with case studies that explore the more complex specific antecedent conditions
(Coppedge 1999). An example is Iversen's (1999) theoretical and econometric analysis of
the joint effects of (accommodating or non-accommodating) monetary policy regimes and
(more or less centralized) wage-setting institutions on inflation and unemployment, backed
up by more detailed historical explorations of developments in a few European countries.
Here, statistical analyses are used to identify probabilistic regularities, while the influence
of various (and changing) institutions on policy choices is presented in the narrative mode.
For Iversen's purposes, that seems a perfectly valid solution.[3]
But what if we are primarily, or at least equally, interested in empirically supported
generalizations about the influence of a greater variety of policy-making institutions on the
capacity for effective policy responses in a wider range of policy areas? From what I have
said, it follows that comparative case studies are likely to be better suited to this task than
multivariate regressions based on quantifiable data and indicators. But it also follows that
in order to arrive at potentially generalizable conclusions, we must then find ways to cope
with the excessive variety and complexity of causal constellations. This can often be
achieved by focusing the comparison on a subset of cases in which it is possible to hold
other contingent conditions sufficiently constant to allow the influence of institutional
variations to be identified with some confidence. But in order to do so, we must have a
theoretical understanding of the contingencies that we are trying to hold constant.
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3 Contingencies
The effect of institutional conditions on the effectiveness of policy choices is contingent on
two broad sets of non-institutional factors - the nature of the problems or challenges that
policy is supposed to meet and the normative and cognitive orientations of policy actors
involved. Both are generally ignored in "structuralist" theories asserting the unconditional
superiority or inferiority of certain policy-making institutions, such as "neo-corporatism" or
the "Westminster" model.
Thus the multiple-veto characteristics of German political institutions may indeed impede
policy changes (Tsebelis 1995) - but compared to the stop-go policies facilitated by the
single-actor British political system, this condition favored successful German economic
policy from the 1950s to the end of the 1980s. In the 1990s, however, when new economic
challenges would have required major policy changes, the same institutional conditions are
considered causes of German policy failures (Manow & Seils 2000). Conversely,
institutional conditions and the challenges arising from the external policy environment did
not change between 1978 and 1979 in Britain, or between 1983 and 1984 in New Zealand.
Nevertheless, radical policy changes were brought about by new governments whose
cognitive and normative orientations differed from those of their predecessors (Rhodes
2000; Schwartz 2000). Both of these contingencies can be specified more precisely.
3.1 Policy Challengens
In the political economy of advanced welfare states, policy challenges are themselves a
complex concept that is best defined by the interaction among three sets of factors -
changes in the policy environment impacting on more or less vulnerable socio-economic
structures and on more or less vulnerable policy legacies.
For examples of recent changes in the policy environment, one may think of the two oil
price crises, of the fall of the Berlin Wall, of the completion of the European internal
market and of the European Monetary Union, but also of demographic changes resulting in
the "graying" of the population, or of changes in family structures increasing the
labor-force participation of women. Such changes will often affect several or many
countries at the same time. But whether and how these will lead to policy problems is
likely to be conditioned by the characteristics of domestic socio-economic structures and
policy legacies.
The importance of differences in socio-economic structures is obvious: The second
oil-price crisis constituted a different type of policy challenge for oil-exporting Norway
than it did for oil-importing welfare states. Similarly, the Danish economy, which is
dominated by small, family-owned enterprises, was less affected by recent increases in
capital mobility than was true of Sweden, where large, multinational enterprises play a
major role (Benner & Vad 2000). The second set of mediating factors is described by the
concept of policy legacies (Skocpol & Weir 1985) which refers to existing policies and the
practices, and expectations based on them. Since their theoretical importance is less
obvious, a clarification seems useful.
Even though policy legacies are the product of past political choices, they are not
necessarily at the disposition of present policy makers. For one thing, not everything can
be changed at the same time in modern, highly differentiated policy systems. In any one
policy area, therefore, the body of existing policy in other areas must mostly be considered
an invariant environment of present policy choices. But even where changes are
considered, they are likely to be impeded by policy inertia. In multi-actor policy systems
with high consensus requirements, innovators will be at a competitive disadvantage in
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interactions with the beneficiaries and defenders of the status quo (Scharpf 1988). But
even if formal (majoritarian) decision rules do not have a conservative bias, the status quo
is favored by the fact that a proposed innovation must not merely appear superior in the
abstract, but that the expected gains must be big enough to also cover the costs of
transition - and that these are likely to increase with the extent to which the new policy
would depart from status-quo solutions. In extreme cases, the status quo may be protected
by "lock-in effects" (David 1985; Arthur 1989; 1990), and even when policy change is
feasible, it is likely to be "path dependent" (Pierson 1996; 1997; Thelen 1999) in the sense
that only certain goals can be reached from a given starting position.
As a consequence, similar changes in the policy environment may constitute problems
differing in nature or in severity, depending on the accidental goodness-of-fit between
these changes and existing national policy legacies. Thus, the policy problem generated by
the first oil-price crisis was massive job losses in countries like Germany, where the
monetary regime was non-accommodating, while rampant inflation became the dominant
problem in Britain and other countries with an accommodating monetary legacy (Scharpf
1991). Similarly, the "graying of the population" constitutes a massive financing problem in
welfare states whose earnings-related pensions are financed by the "pay-as-you-go"
contributions of a shrinking active population, whereas "funded" pension systems are much
less threatened. Under conditions of increasing international competition and capital
mobility, moreover, the characteristic differences in the policy legacies of Scandinavian,
Continental, and Anglo-Saxon welfare states (Esping-Andersen 1990; 1999), of national
production systems (Soskice 1999; Estevez-Abe et al. 1999) and of industrial-relations
systems (Crouch 1993; Golden et al. 1999) have come to matter very much for the
problem load that must be faced by national policy systems (Scharpf 2000a; Scharpf &
Schmidt 2000).
3.2 Actor Orientations
In combination, external changes impacting on given socio-economic structures and policy
legacies will create time and country-specific patterns of vulnerabilities which, in
democratic polities, are transformed into challenges to which policy actors may have to
respond. That these responses are influenced by the institutional setting is generally
assumed, but the dominant strands of current institutionalist theorizing, "rational-choice
institutionalism" and "sociological institutionalism" (Hall & Taylor 1996; Thelen 1999), [4]
differ in their conceptualization of these influences, even though both make quite strong
claims about the value of institutions as predictors of what actors will in fact do.
In sociological institutionalism, institutions are defined very broadly, so as to include not
only externally imposed and sanctioned rules, but also unquestioned routines and standard
operating procedures and, more importantly, socially constructed and culturally taken-
for-granted world views and shared normative notions of "appropriateness" (Berger &
Luckmann 1966; March & Olsen 1989; DiMaggio & Powell 1991; Zucker 1991). In that
view, therefore, institutions will define not only what actors can do, but also their
perceptions and preferences - and thus what they will want to do.
In rational-choice institutionalism, by contrast, institutional rules are understood as
external constraints and incentives structuring the purposeful choices of self-interested
rational actors (Shepsle 1989; North 1990). But since actors are also assumed to have
standardized and stable preferences defined by their personal or organizational
self-interest, and since they are assumed to be rational in the sense that their perceptions
can be taken to be correct representations of the objective situation, and that their
cognitive capabilities are sufficient to identify the consequences of available options for
their self-interest, the knowledge of institutions will also allow predictions and explanations
MPIfG - MPIfG Working Paper 00/3, Fritz W. Scharpf: Institutions in ... http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp00-3/wp00-3.html
6 von 23 12.07.2011 11:35
of what actors will in fact do. As George Tsebelis (1999a, 4) has put it: "Since institutions
determine the choices of actors, the sequence of moves, as well as the information they
control, different institutional structures will produce different strategies of the actors, and
different outcomes of their interactions."
In the light of empirical policy research, however, both of these theoretical positions
appear much too deterministic.[5] Above, I referred to the examples of Britain in 1978/79
and New Zealand in 1983/84, but the point can be stated more generally: Even if external
and institutional conditions remain constant, policies can change if the cognitive and
normative orientations of policy makers change - as they did when Keynesianism was
replaced by monetarist and neo-liberal economic paradigms (Hall 1992; 1993). In our own
framework of "actor centered institutionalism" (Mayntz & Scharpf 1995; Scharpf 1997),
we therefore find it necessary to treat actor orientations (i.e., their preferences and
perceptions) as a theoretically distinct category - influenced, but not determined by the
institutional framework within which interactions occur.
In our view, actor preferences[6] have at least two dimensions, individual and
organizational self-interest on the one hand, and (internalized) normative obligations and
aspirations on the other hand.[7] In the organization-theoretic literature, this corresponds
to the distinction between "system maintenance" and "goal attainment" (Etzioni 1964,
16-19), and there it is generally assumed that in cases of conflict the former takes
precedence over the latter.[8] In any case, the "goals" of corporate and collective actors
are strongly influenced by the institutional rules to which they owe their existence and by
institutional and cultural norms which define the criteria of their success or failure.[9] For
that reason, they will vary greatly between different types of actors - political parties,
government ministries, unions, central banks, etc. -, and in time and place. By contrast, the
"maintenance" or survival interests in assuring adequate organizational resources,
defending organizational autonomy, and (where institutionally relevant) achieving
competitive success, are likely to be more uniform and constant - which allows fairly
general and reliable predictions of organizational responses to institutional incentives (and
hence useful suggestions for institutional design).[10]
Like actor preferences, cognitive orientations are also shaped by institutional norms and
incentives defining the role-specific content of "conventional wisdom" and "selective
perceptions" (Dearborn and Simon 1958). Central banks will pay more attention than union
leaders to early indicators of inflation. Moreover, certain policy areas may be dominated
by the specific paradigms (Hall 1993) of particular "advocacy coalitions" (Sabatier 1987;
1999) or "epistemic communities" (Haas 1992). Beyond that, the capacity for effective
policy responses is affected not only by the quantity and quality, but also by the diversity
of policy-relevant information and analysis provided by an institutionalized information
infrastructure. Thus, in the heyday of Austro-Keynesianism in the 1970s, policy
coordination in Austria was greatly facilitated by the fact that the government, the political
parties and the social partners relied on the analyses provided by a single economic
research institute. In Germany, by contrast, unions and employers maintain separate
research institutes, the federal government and the Länder support altogether six such
institutes; the federal labor administration as well as the Bundesbank maintain large
in-house research capacities, the independent Council of Economic Advisors relies on its
own research staff, and the big commercial banks also have their own macro-economic
research departments. All of these provide not only data, explanations, and policy
recommendations for their respective sponsors, but they also publish their often
inconsistent findings and contradictory interpretations - which are then debated in the
financial press and in the economic and financial pages of the general press, and which
allow very different policy proposals to claim "scientific" support.
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The downside of the monopoly model are, of course, the risks of "groupthink" (Janis 1972)
- that is, of the failure to pay attention to observations, interpretations and
recommendations that do not conform to the dominant world view. This was arguably the
case in Britain in the early 1970s, when policy makers in the Treasury continued to rely on
the Keynesian recommendations derived from the single macro-economic simulation
model even though the economy had ceased to respond as predicted (Hall 1992). But when
the analyses of institutionalized information monopolists do fit the problem (and if they are
believed) they will facilitate effective problem-solving in single-actor systems and effective
coordination in multi-actor systems. The pluralistic model, by contrast, will provide
protection against the institutionalization of error. But the cacophony of voices may render
coherent policy choices difficult even in single-actor systems, and is likely to work against
cooperative or at least coordinated problem solving in multi-actor systems.
4 Dimensions of Institutional Effects
We thus have three major sets of variables that will affect the capacity of a system to come
up with effective policy responses: the nature of the policy problem, the orientations of
policy actors, and the characteristics of the institutional setting. Since each of these will
vary greatly over time and space, comparative policy research will be faced with a
dilemma: If we try to cover a variety of significant policy choices in a larger set of
countries (say, the usual OECD-18 set), the number and diversity of distinct factor
constellations will overwhelm available methods of multivariate statistical analysis as well
as Ragin's (1987) Boolean "qualitative comparative analysis". And if we try to instead
select our cases by the logic of "most similar systems" or "most different systems" designs
(Przeworski & Teune 1970) in order to identify the influence of a single set of factors, we
are likely to end up with very few cases at best. Thus, focusing on Britain in 1978/79 or on
New Zealand in 1983/84 does in fact allow us to identify the influence of actor orientations
while problems and institutions are held constant. Similarly, in my "Crisis and Choice in
European Social Democracy" (Scharpf 1991), I selected four countries (Austria, Britain,
Germany and Sweden) which during the 1970s were faced with the same problems of
"stagflation", and which at the time had governments with strong preferences for the
maintenance of full employment and with cognitive orientations shaped by the Keynesian
paradigm. Within this design it was then relatively easy to relate differences in policy
choices to differences of institutional structures (in particular, central-bank independence
and concentrated or fragmented collective bargaining institutions).
4.1 The Need for Institutionalist Working Hypotheses
In comparative policy research, however, we want to study a larger population of countries
and policy choices, or seek to explain cases selected for their topical interest, rather than
by the logic of a variance-controlling research designs. Still, for the reasons discussed
above, a purely empirical approach would not serve our purposes. Instead, we might rely
on theoretically grounded working hypotheses, rather than empirical research, for some
causal influences in order to simplify and guide our empirical search for other explanatory
factors. Preferably, these should be hypotheses with high predictive power - meaning that
they should allow us to form precise expectations about significant causes and effects on
the basis of relatively limited and easily obtainable information (Scharpf 1997, chapter 1).
Such hypotheses are clearly not available for all factors involved in our complex
constellations. We have no general theory that would allow us to predict the occurrence of
policy problems or the characteristics of effective solutions. These need to be identified by
case-specific problem and policy analyses. Similarly, we have no general theory predicting
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the type of institutional settings within which policy interactions take place. They also need
to be identified empirically in the specific cases at hand. But once we have obtained both
of these sets of empirical information, we can use them to formulate theoretically grounded
expectations of the policy responses which we should expect under the circumstances.
Substantive problem and policy analyses will generate policy recommendations of a
prescriptive character which, however, can be converted into empirically relevant
predictions if they are coupled with the assumption that the perceptions of all policy actors
are identical with those of the policy analyst, and that the preferences of all policy actors
are exclusively defined by a normative commitment to maximizing the public interest as
defined by the policy recommendations of the analyst. If these (unrealistic) assumptions
were true, institutions would only play a very limited role. But since we have reason to
think that institutions matter, we also need hypotheses that predict their influence on the
effectiveness of policy responses.
This influence is most obvious where formal institutional rules impose direct constraints on
the repertoire of permissible policy choices. But we expect that within this repertoire the
actual choice among permissible options is also affected by institutional rules prescribing
actor constellations and modes of interaction, and by institutional incentives and
disincentives affecting actor preferences. For formulating such predictions, rational-choice
institutionalism has a clear advantage over the less information-efficient sociological
variety. Its predictive power depends precisely on its narrow focus on the incentive-effect
of institutional rules on organizational self-interest and on the assumption of complete
information and adequate information processing capacity. Thus, if we know how the
organizational self-interest of specific policy actors would be affected the available
responses to given policy challenges, and if we know the actor constellation and the
applicable rules of the game, we can then apply a range of analytical (essentially
game-theoretic) tools to predict the policy outcome that interactions between rational and
self-interested policy actors would produce in the specific case.
From what was said above, it follos of course that both of these predictions are based on
unrealistic assumptions and thus will often be false. But that does not mean that they
would be useless.[11] I will return to this point in the concluding section, and now turn to a
brief overview of the institutional hypotheses that are likely to play a major role in
comparative policy studies.
4.2 Constraints on Permissible Policy Options
Countries differ in the range of institutionally permissible policy options. An example is the
power of governments to determine wages and working time - an option which was
routinely exercised by Belgian governments in the 1980s and 1990s, and which is available
in most other countries as well, but which is ruled out in Germany by the constitutional
guarantee of collective bargaining. Similarly, the judicial interpretation of the German
constitution imposes narrow constraints on the permissible extent of property taxation, and
it is claimed to rule out a Scandinavian-type "dual income tax" which would tax capital
incomes more lightly than incomes from other sources. Admittedly, the German case
represents an extreme example of legalism-cum-judicial-activism, but similar legal fetters -
for instance on the public debt - can be found in other constitutional democracies as well.
More important for most countries is the increasing tightness of international legal
constraints. Thus, the blatant protectionism which shielded import-substituting
industrialization in Australia and New Zealand well into the 1980s (Schwarz 2000) would
now be liable to massive legal sanctions by the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Similarly, the tight control of capital transfers, and the highly discriminatory regulation of
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credit markets which facilitated the success of macro-economic full-employment strategies
in Sweden until the mid 1980s (Benner & Vad 2000), would now be ruled out by EU
directives liberalizing capital markets and financial services. More generally, the rules of
"negative integration" and in particular, European competition law have become a major
constraint on all economic-policy options that could be construed as inhibiting or distorting
free competition in the markets of EU member states (Scharpf 1999a). And countries that
have joined the European Monetary Union not only had to transfer their monetary
competencies to the (totally independent) European Central Bank, but they also had to
accept legally binding constraints on their fiscal-policy options. As a consequence, the
option of achieving full employment through Keynesian strategies of demand reflation is
no longer available at the national level among EMU member states.
4.3 Actor Constellations and Modes of Interaction
In addition to imposing substantive prohibitions, institutional rules also define the
constellations of actors that may participate in the adoption and implementation of policy
responses as well as their permissible modes of interaction - which could be classified as
"mutual adjustment", "negotiated agreement", "voting" or "hierarchical direction" (Scharpf
1997). Together, these rules determine the most basic and policy-relevant characteristic of
the institutional setting, namely the number of formal "veto positions" (Tsebelis 1995). In
extreme simplification, one may thus speak of "single-actor constellations " in which all
relevant policy choices are potentially determined by the preferences and perceptions
prevailing in a unified action center, or of "multiple-actor constellations" in which effective
policy depends on the choices of several independent actors that may be acting from
separate and potentially conflicting preferences and perceptions.[12] Here, policy can be
blocked at multiple veto positions, and effective action will depend on negotiated
agreement. The theoretical expectation is that, everything else being equal, the adoption of
policy changes will be more difficult in multiple-actor than in single-actor constellations.
In practice, most policy choices result from multi-actor interactions. But some countries,
whose political institutions approximate the ideal "Westminster model", have the option of
treating any major policy problem in a single-actor constellation (Wilson 1994). In other
words, hierarchical direction is an institutionally available mode of interaction[13]. This
ideal type was approximated in Britain under Thatcher, and in New Zealand until the 1993
reform of the electoral system, but despite the existence of coalition governments, France
also comes close to the single-actor pattern (Schmidt l996, chapters 1 and 2). Germany, by
contrast, is characterized by a multi-actor constellation with coalition governments and a
bicameral parliament at the center, autonomous subnational governments, an independent
central bank, an independent constitutional court, and with constitutional guarantees of
autonomous collective bargaining by unions and employers' associations, and an even more
extreme example of a multiple-veto system is the Swiss combination of bicameralism,
all-party coalitions, and the referendum.
4.4 Institutions as Structures of Incentives
Institutional rules will affect policy responses not only by restricting options and by
constituting actor constellations and regulating their modes of interaction but also by
structuring the incentives of the participating actors. In rational-choice institutionalism,
these incentives are defined by reference to the self-interest of the corporate and collective
actors involved in the policy process - e.g., governments, political parties, central banks,
labor unions, their sub-units or the individuals acting for them.[14] In single-actor systems,
the incentives that have the most direct effect on policy choices are constituted by the
mechanisms of political accountability. In multi-actor systems, accountability is weakened,
and policy outcomes are more affected by incentives favoring cooperation or conflict
among the veto-actors.
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4.4.1 Accountability Incentives
Accountability is most clearly institutionalized in Westminster-type political systems in
which all policy competencies are concentrated in a central government whose choices are
controlled by the winner in periodic two-party electoral competition. Under the restrictive
assumption of a one-dimensional and single-peaked distribution of voter preferences, this
model creates incentives for self-interested governments to adopt policies corresponding to
the preferences of the median voter (Downs 1957), and under even more restrictive
assumptions of complete information all around, these policies would maximize aggregate
welfare (Mueller 1989). It should not be forgotten, however, that under the same complete-
information assumptions, and in the absence of transaction costs, the Coase-Theorem
predicts that welfare-maximizing outcomes would also be achieved in consociational
democracies through negotiations among parties and associations representing the interests
of affected groups (Coase 1960; Scharpf 1997, chapters 6 and 8). Under idealized
conditions, in other words, democratic accountability would assure effective policy
responses in multi-actor as well as in single-actor constellations.
In the real world, however, policy information is incomplete and contested, and inter-group
negotiations are impeded by high transaction costs. Under these conditions, it is plausible
that voters as well as the members of organized interest groups will oppose policy changes
whose immediate impact on their status-quo interest position is negative. Then the
institutions of democratic accountability create incentives favoring policies maximizing
short-term benefits and avoiding short-term costs for voters and interest groups - which
may prevent the adoption of effective policy responses to manifest problems. But the
extent to which this is likely varies with the specifics of institutional arrangements.
For one thing, an increasing number of countries have exempted certain policy functions
from the control of democratically accountable governments and legislative majorities - by
providing constitutional courts, independent central banks or cartel offices with a greater,
though surely not unlimited,[15] freedom to pursue unpopular policies. To an even greater
(and from the perspective of democratic accountability much more problematic) degree,
this is also true of the European Central Bank, of the European Commission, and of the
European Court of Justice in its role as interpreter and guardian of Treaty obligations -
under institutional rules where its interpretation of the Treaties could only be reversed by
unanimous agreement among member governments that needs to be ratified by the
parliaments of all member states (Scharpf 1999a). On the other hand, the negative
incentive-effect of democratic accountability increases with the proximity of elections and
their expected salience for the parties in power. Thus, the fact the legislative term was
shortened to three years in 1970 is said to have reduced the capacity of Swedish
governments to govern from a long-term perspective (Immergut 1999), and in France
shorter intervals between parliamentary and presidential elections have been shown to
affect the willingness of governments to maintain potentially unpopular initiatives (Bonoli
1997). In Germany, the government is even less insulated from short-term electoral
pressures since the four-year parliamentary term is punctuated by altogether 16 Land
elections that affect the partisan composition of the Bundesrat. By contrast, the realization
of Margaret Thatcher's radical reforms benefited from the five-year interval between
general elections, and even more from the fact that she was facing a divided opposition
which, under first-past-the-post election rules, practically ruled out electoral defeat.
It is clear, then, that national institutions differ greatly in the extent to which they expose
governments to incentives favoring policies responding to short-term voter reactions, rather
than strategies which, though initially unpopular, may demonstrate their effectiveness and
convince voters in the longer term. But it should be kept in mind that, first, the
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organizational self-interest that is affected by these incentives does not circumscribe the
full range of action-relevant preferences. Political parties and governments may be
committed to normative goals and role obligations that will override electoral concerns - as
was true of the Lubbers coalition government in the Netherlands which stuck to its
unpopular retrenchment program in the face of practically certain electoral defeat in 1994
(Visser and Hemerijck 1997). Even more important, governments are not necessarily
helpless when faced with negative voter reactions. They may be able to engage opposition
parties, organized interests, the media and the general public in policy-oriented discourses
that explain and justify the course of action that is proposed and the sacrifices associated
with it. Again, however, their capacity to do so is influenced by institutional conditions - it
is greater in single-actor polities, where the government can speak with one voice, than it is
in multiple-veto constellations where policy choices will often have the character of
compromises among conflicting goals that are difficult to justify from the positions of any
one of the parties involved in their adoption (Schmidt 2000).
4.4.2 Incentives to Collaborate in Multi-Actor Systems
Depending on whether unilateral policy action is, or is not, a realizable option, it is useful
to distinguish between two variants of multi-actor systems: In the first case, which one may
call "policy fragmentation", some of the instruments of public policy that are required for
the adoption of a successful policy response to a given problem are not under the control
of a single actor but are exercised by independent agents - a formally independent
constitutional court, a de-facto independent central bank or cartel office, autonomous
subnational governments, and in Europe, the EU Commission and the European Court of
Justice. The effect of policy fragmentation is, first, to limit the range of policy options
which a single actor may unilaterally adopt and implement and, second, to raise the
possibility that mutually inconsistent unilateral policy choices will interfere with each
other; and even if some coordination is achieved by actors responding to others' choices in
the mode of "mutual adjustment", the outcome may still be suboptimal.[16] If that is to be
avoided, coordination through negotiated agreement[17] among independent actors may be
required.
In the second case, which I have called "joint decision making" (Scharpf 1988), none of
the parties is allowed (or physically able) to act unilaterally. Here, effective policy
responses can only be adopted and implemented with the agreement of several
independent actors. That may be true even in single-party governments if ministers are
representatives of intra-party factions that cannot be ignored by the prime minister, or if
ministries enjoy a large degree of constitutional autonomy so that policy conflicts among
them must be resolved through inter-ministerial negotiations or through the cabinet as a
collegiate body (Mayntz & Scharpf 1975). In coalition governments, the agreement of
separate political parties, each with its own policy goals and organizational self interest, is
generally necessary for important policy choices (Budge & Laver 1993), and in bicameral
legislatures the second chamber may have a veto that is exercised by partisan majorities
differing from those in the first chamber.
Given that no policy system is truly single-actor, the difficulties of effective action depend,
of course, on the substantive convergence or divergence of policy preferences among the
veto players involved (Tsebelis 1995; 1999b). In contrast to mutual adjustment, the Coase-
Theorem (Coase 1960) assures us that in the absence of transaction costs negotiations are
able to achieve efficient outcomes in all constellations where potential gains from
cooperation exist. But since transaction costs are never absent, the probability of
agreement depends very much on issue-independent incentives favoring cooperation or
conflict that are inherent in different institutional settings.
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General incentives for cooperation should be strongest within single-party and unitary
governments of the Westminster model. Even if intra-party factions may compete with
each other for policy influence and career opportunities, and even if individual ministerial
departments may enjoy considerable autonomy, all office holders of the governing party
must win or lose elections together, and thus should have strong incentives to cooperate on
successful policies. Similar incentives also exist among the parties in a coalition
government that should have a common interest in the success of their government. But
since each of them must ultimately face its own clienteles and voters separately, there are
also incentives to sharpen one's own profile through tough bargaining strategies and even
open conflicts within the coalition - which may then delay, distort, or even block effective
solutions. Blockage is more likely in the "end-game" phase of an election period than in the
"honeymoon" of a new coalition, and it is generally more likely in multi-party systems with
an expectation of rapidly changing governing coalitions - so that unilateral concessions in
the interest of longer-term cooperation are unlikely to have high future payoffs. This was
true of multi-party coalition governments in the French IVth Republic, and of Italian
governments before the early 1990s, whose capacity for effective policy responses was
generally very low. By contrast, the Danish multi-party system seems to have evolved into
a pattern of relatively stable minority governments that are free to seek the support of
variable ad-hoc majorities for their policy initiatives, and that are thus able to achieve a
remarkably high degree of problem-solving capacity ( Benner & Vad 2000).[18] Thus, its
ad-hoc coalitions may be formed exclusively on the basis of convergent substantive policy
interests, whereas longer-term government coalitions are usually based on agreements that
rule out voting with the opposition against another coalition party - with the consequence
that effective policy responses may be blocked within the coalition even though they
would have majority support in the full parliament.
At the opposite extreme are constellations of "divided government" where institutional
incentives favor conflict, rather than cooperation. This is true in bicameral legislatures,
when partisan majorities in both houses are opposed to each other (Laver & Shepsle 1991;
Krehbiel 1996). Somewhat similar conditions may obtain in all constitutional democracies
when effective policy solutions require constitutional amendments[19] that can only be
passed by super-majorities including parties in opposition to the government of the day.
Under these conditions, even compromises that would advance the substantive policy goals
of the opposition may be blocked. Since governments and opposition parties are engaged in
zero-sum competition for the votes of the same electorate, the opposition has not only a
substantive interest in promoting its own policy goals through favorable compromises, but
also a competitive interest[20] in defeating government initiatives in order to undermine its
reputation for competent and successful political action. Thus conditions of divided
government are particularly unfavorable for effective but unpopular policy responses with
a high party-political salience (Laver & Shepsle 1991; Alt & Lowry 1994).[21]
In between these extremes are located attempts to achieve effective policy responses
through "joint decision making" between governments and independent public agencies or
social-partnership organizations, or among different national or subnational governments
with autonomous jurisdictions and separate constituencies (as is true of negotiations in the
EU Councils of Ministers). Here, agreement is not facilitated by a generally shared interest
in the success of a joint venture, but neither is it impeded by disincentives arising from
political competition. As long as each party is unchallenged in its own institutional domain,
self-interested cooperation on substantive solutions has a chance under the "Coase
Theorem" whenever the policy goals pursued by all parties are better achieved through
concerted, rather than through separate action. In fact, much public-sector problem-solving
does occur in the form of agreements among local or regional or national governments, and
the important achievements of European integration are best explained in terms of
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intergovernmental agreements as well (Moravcsik 1998).
Going beyond the Coase Theorem (which presupposes that agreements can only be
achieved if all parties involved will benefit from it), long-standing patterns of successful
substantive collaboration may create additional generalized incentives to maintain
cooperation even if one or the other party must accept short-term sacrifices to its own
institutional or policy interests. Such incentives are said to explain the long-term success of
social-partnership institutions in Austria (Marin 1987; Heinisch 1999). Nevertheless, even
institutionalized "corporatist" cooperation cannot be taken for granted. The breakdown of
"Concerted Action" in Germany in the early 1970s (Scharpf 1991, chapter 7), the
complete, but temporary, suspension of coordinated wage setting in the Netherlands during
the 1970s (Visser & Hemerijck 1997), and the erosion of centralized wage setting in
Sweden in the 1980s (Compston 1995; Pestoff 1995) demonstrate that generalized
incentives are unlikely to maintain cooperation in the face of sustained conflicts over either
policy goals or institutional self-interest among the parties involved.
5 Strategies for Comparative Policy Research
This overview of hypotheses regarding institutional incentives and their policy-relevant
effects on organizational self-interest of corporate and collective actors could be extended
from the arenas of parliamentary and intergovernmental interaction to other arenas in
which important policy choices are determined - e.g., interactions in monetary policy,
industrial relations, or European regulation. Moreover, the hypotheses themselves could
and should be formulated with greater differentiation and precision regarding the assumed
organizational self-interest of different types of actors and the likely incentive effects of
different types of institutional arrangements. Given the deductive methods of rational-
choice institutionalism, the formulation of such hypotheses would not pose serious
difficulties - and given a suitable data base, some of these hypotheses may also be
corroborated by statistical analyses (see e.g., Bawn 1999; Tsebelis 1999b).
As I emphasized above, however, in the specific case the hypotheses derived from rational-
choice institutionalism will often turn out false. So what is the role that they could and
should play in comparative policy research that is less interested in statistical probabilities
than in explaining the outcomes of individual cases? The answer is that having such
hypotheses is as useful for comparative case studies as having a regression line in a
scattergram is for the exploration of quantitative relationships: It focuses attention on the
"residuals" - i.e., on cases where the prediction is not confirmed.
In fact, from what I said about the relationship between problem-oriented and interaction-
oriented policy research, it follows that we are able to work with two different sets of
theory-based hypotheses: On the one hand, problem-oriented policy analyses predict the
choices we should expect if all policy actors had complete information and were
exclusively motivated to realize public-interest maximizing outcomes. On the other hand,
rational-choice institutionalist analyses predict the choices we should expect if all policy
actors had complete information and were exclusively motivated to realize self-interest
maximizing outcomes. If these two predictions agree, we could conclude that institutional
incentives are favoring the adoption of effective policy responses to the problem in
question. If they disagree, such responses are made more difficult by institutional
obstacles. But since (multi-purpose) political institutions can rarely be optimized with a
view to specific policy problems, [22] this abstract evaluation of institutional incentive-
effects is not our main concern.
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However, empirical policy research benefits very much from being able to compare the
observed outcome of policy interactions to these two theory-based predictions, both of
which rely on highly stylized assumptions about actor orientations. If the outcome should
agree with either of these, we could content ourselves with having obtained a satisfactory
explanation. But when that is not the case (i.e., most of the time), we now have at least a
clear idea of where to search for explanations. Since both the nature of the problem and
the institutional incentives have already been accounted for, the explanation must be found
in actor orientations that differ from the stylized assumptions underlying our predictions.
Thus we now must seek empirical information on the actual preferences and perceptions of
the policy actors involved.
More specifically, we should seek for cognitive orientations that deviate from the
information and cause-and-effect hypotheses of the substantive problem and policy
analyses which we consider to be true. At the same time, we should also seek for actor
preferences that differ from either the perfectly public-interested or the perfectly
self-interested motivations assumed in our hypotheses. In doing so, it is often very useful -
in the spirit of Lindenberg's (1990) "method of decreasing abstraction" - to begin by
focusing on the institutionalized "norms of appropriateness" that are emphasized by
sociological institutionalism (March & Olsen 1989), and to move on to searching for more
idiosyncratic normative orientations and identity concepts only when the more stylized
institutional hypotheses fail to explain choices. In any case, however, the discrepancy
between theoretical predictions and observed policy choices will guide and greatly simplify
the empirical search for those preferences and perceptions that actually can explain the
failure to adopt effective policy responses.
To give an example: After the Bundesbank had switched to monetarism in the mid 1970s,
all countries that had pegged their currencies to the German mark (Austria, Denmark, the
Netherlands, and Belgium) were confronted with the same hard-currency environment
which, in the absence of union wage restraint, would produce high unemployment. When
faced with this challenge, rational-institutionalism would tell us, the centralization or
fragmentation of wage-setting institutions should not matter: Large or small unions alike
should find it in their organizational self-interest to save the jobs of their members through
wage restraint. In Germany and Austria, this is what happened within a year or two,
whereas collective bargaining in Denmark, Belgium and the Netherlands continued to
generate wage inflation even under conditions of steeply rising unemployment. Since
institutional incentives cannot explain these differences, the comparison would then have
to focus on the influence of cognitive misperceptions and normative (ideological)
orientations that prevented the unions in some countries, but not in others, from fully
appreciating the impact of a change in (German) monetary policy on their own
employment situation (Scharpf 2000b).
The example has several interesting implications for research strategies: First, what counts
as a "case" in comparative case studies depends on what is to be explained. In comparative
policy research, that is trying to explain differences in policy response to a given challenge,
the case is defined by the set of interactions connecting the challenge to the response.
Since the historical processes we are studying contain a considerable variety of (often
nested) policy challenges, we have considerable freedom in selecting sets of cases which,
at minimum, are similar with regard to the policy challenge that was being faced. In the
example, we could have focused on the full set of countries that were members in the
European currency "snake" in 1973/74, asking why some of them responded to the
German switch to monetarism by quitting the snake, whereas others maintained their
commitment to a hard-currency position. Among the subset of soft-currency countries, we
could then compare responses to the challenge of escalating rates of inflation; among the
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hard-currency countries, in turn, comparison would focus on responses to rising
unemployment, and so on. Among these sets defined by similar challenges, moreover, it
should usually be possible to identify subsets of cases that have additional causal factors in
common - which would then permit a more precise focus on a narrower range of
explanatory variables.
Combined with the use of rational-choice working hypotheses, then, structured
comparisons within varying subsets of cases seem to be our best hope for building a body
of generalizable knowledge about the causal relations between types of policy challenges,
types of institutional structures, and actor orientations. Moreover, by switching between
overlapping subsets of cases defined by either common challenges, or common actor
orientations or common institutions, we should be able to increase our confidence in the
explanations discovered in each of these dimensions. These explanations will surely not
amount to a general and comprehensive theory, but they will go beyond the ad-hoc
explanations that are otherwise characteristic of historical case studies (Scharpf 2000b).
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Endnotes
1   Most of my examples will be taken from the fields which I know best - cross-national
comparative studies of welfare-state and employment policy responses to changes in the
international economic environment (Scharpf 1991; Scharpf and Schmidt 2000).
2   Worse yet, if such case studies are written with the self-conscious intent of producing
inductive generalizations, they are likely to contribute to the endless cycle of
over-generalized propositions and false falsifications that plagues not only the study of
European politics (Scharpf 1999b).
3   Another interesting combination of methods is used by Hicks (1999) who relies on
multivariate regressions where quantitative time-series data are available, but resorts to
Ragin's (1987) "qualitative comparative analysis" where only qualitative data can be
obtained.
4   "Historical institutionalism", the third strand discussed in these overviews, is primarily
interested in the path-dependent evolution of institutional forms (Steinmo and Thelen
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1992; Pierson 1997), but has no distinct theory of its own about the way institutions
influence actors' choices. Some authors lean more toward rational-choice assumptions,
others toward social-constructivist interpretations.
5   I should add that my presentation of the differences between the two is also overdrawn.
For a more integrative discussion, see Thelen (1999). From the rational-choice side, a
useful theoretical bridge is built by Lindenberg's (1989) concept of socio-culturally defined
"production functions" through which (or the social roles in which) the abstract individual
self-interest in physical well-being and social recognition must be concretely pursued. For
the organizational self-interest of corporate actors, this concept seems even more pertinent.
6   Preferences, in our view must be understood as relatively stable ("pre-strategic")
criteria for the evaluation of outcomes, rather than as tentative commitments to a particular
strategy (which may of course be changed quite easily by "arguments" providing new
information). If this distinction is kept in mind, much fruitless debate over the need to
"endogenize preferences" in analyses of policy interactions could be avoided.
7   A third dimension is defined by identity concepts that may be more specific than
institutionalized norms and role obligations (Scharpf 1997, chapter 3).
8   The point is nicely made in the dictum, ascribed to Lyndon Johnson, that "you got to be
re-elected to be a statesman".
9   See the reference to "production functions" in note 5, above.
10   It is puzzling that in modeling the effect of institutional rules on policy choices,
Tsebelis (1995; 1999a) considers only the "goal" dimension (expressed by the ideological
distance between veto players) while ignoring the "maintenance" dimension (e.g., the
effect of competitive incentives on the organizational self-interest of corporate actors and
hence on their willingness to reach agreement).
11   In this regard, the approach discussed here differs from the "analytic-narratives"
approach (Bates et al.1998) which expects rational-choice analyses to provide complete
explanations of historically unique cases.
12   The same kind of descriptors may be used to characterize wage-setting systems. Here,
effective decisions may, again, be vertically centralized and horizontally concentrated in
the arena of peak-level negotiations among monopoly associations of capital and labor;
located at the level national industrial sectors and branches; or decentralized to regional
negotiations, to firm-level or shop floor negotiations, or even to individual employment
contracts.
13   The center would be hopelessly overloaded if choices were in fact made there in many
cases (Downs 1967). Nevertheless, the fact that any decision could be centralized is likely
to affect the choices made "in the shadow of hierarchy" at the level of departments or
agencies (Scharpf 1997, chapter 9).
14   I will not here go into intricacies of when it is useful to ascribe actor qualities to
corporate and collective actors, and when it is necessary to focus on sub-units thereof or
even on individuals (Scharpf 1997, chapter 3), except to note that in general the incentives
for individuals acting in the name of corporate and collective actors are closely linked to
their success in terms of organizational self-interest.
MPIfG - MPIfG Working Paper 00/3, Fritz W. Scharpf: Institutions in ... http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp00-3/wp00-3.html
21 von 23 12.07.2011 11:35
15   The celebrated independence of the German Bundesbank could have been abolished
by ordinary legislation. That it was maintained even in major conflicts with governments of
the day, from Konrad Adenauer to Helmut Kohl, was due to broad public support for its
institutional independence.
16   More precisely, the efficiency of the outcome depends entirely on the underlying
constellations of actor interests. If they correspond to a "Battle of the Sexes" - which is the
constellation that Carey (this volume) is primarily considering - mutual adjustment may be
highly efficient. A real-world example was the adjustment of German unions after 1975 to
the monetary policy announced annually by the Bundesbank. But if the underlying
constellation should resemble a Chicken Game or the Prisoner's Dilemma, mutual
adjustment would produce highly undesirable policy outcomes. A real-world example was
the inflationary wage competition among British unions in the 1970s (Scharpf 1987).
17   Negotiated coordination may take two forms: "Negative coordination" merely avoids
policies that would have negative external effects on other policy areas, whereas ""positive
coordination" attempts to maximize the gains from cooperation (Scharpf 1997, chapter 6).
18   Blom-Hansen (1999) points to a second mechanism facilitating effective problem
solving in Scandinavian countries, namely the government's choice among alternative
arenas of decision making - parliamentary, intergovernmental, and corporatist.
19   Such conditions are most likely to occur in countries where an "activist" constitutional
court is deeply involved in substantive policy choices - which is true of courts in Germany
and Denmark, and increasingly in Italy and France. In that sense, constitutional courts may
be able to create the very political deadlocks which George Tsebelis (1999a) sees as their
major source of power.
20   Competitive incentives may be softened by expectations of an imminent return to
government. Thus, in Sweden in the early 1990s, opposition social democrats collaborated
with the conservative government in designing cuts in welfare-state expenditures they
considered necessary. For the Netherlands in the 1980s, it is also suggested that the social
democrats did not attack on the unpopular reforms of the christian-liberal government
because they hoped to join a future coalition with the christian democrats (Green-Pedersen
1999).
21   There is a parallel in International Relations, where the "Realist" school assumes a
dominance of competitive incentives that force states to pursue "relative", rather than
"absolute gains" (Waltz 1979) whereas "Liberal" theorists assert the theoretical possibility
and practical importance of international agreements capturing "absolute" gains from
cooperation (Keohane 1984).
22   The exception are institutions that are explicitly designed to serve a single purpose - as
may be true of the European Central Bank which is supposed to be exclusively committed
to price stability.
Copyright © 2000 Fritz W. Scharpf
No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted without permission in writing from the
author.
Jegliche Vervielfältigung und Verbreitung, auch auszugsweise, bedarf der Zustimmung des Autors.
MPI für Gesellschaftsforschung, Paulstr. 3, 50676 Köln, Germany
 
 
 
MPIfG - MPIfG Working Paper 00/3, Fritz W. Scharpf: Institutions in ... http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp00-3/wp00-3.html
22 von 23 12.07.2011 11:35
   
 
  
MPIfG:  MPIfG Working Paper 00/3
http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp00-3/wp00-3.html
[Zuletzt geändert am 29.03.2007 15:50]
 
 
MPIfG - MPIfG Working Paper 00/3, Fritz W. Scharpf: Institutions in ... http://www.mpifg.de/pu/workpap/wp00-3/wp00-3.html
23 von 23 12.07.2011 11:35
